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This article proposes the concept of catastrophe as a starting point for the construction of 
appropriate representation strategies for phenomena of extreme social violence, exploring the 
case of the forced disappearance of individuals in Argentina and Uruguay. The analysis begins with 
a paradox: this process represents the culmination of policies for the construction and 
management of the population in post-colonial America, and is simultaneously applicable to the 
most completely formed products of this policy, namely individual citizens. Due to this paradox, 
the forced disappearance of individuals implies unsolvable problems in terms of interpreting the 
ha a te isti  ide tit  a d la guage of the i ilizi g p o ess,  the i di idual-citizen and direct 
representation. Thus, disappearance situates identity and language within the terrain of 
catastrophe, demanding that our representation strategies be reconsidered.  
Keywords: Argentina; catastrophe; civilization; disappeared; identity; representation; state 
terrorism; Uruguay; social violence. 
 
 
This text explores problems that are difficult to resolve, associated with understanding what 
happens to social life when it is removed from the parameters that define it within the terms 
of modern conventions, in particular the convention that binds words to things and 
representations to facts. There are many situations nowadays in which this convention is 
broken, some banal and others extreme. This article focuses on one of the latter cases, 
namely forced disappearance, an extreme situation that forces us to seriously reconsider the 
relationship between memory, social life, identity and representation.  
In order to address this extreme situation, I will make use an old concept, that of 
catastrophe. After introducing the concept, I intend to analyse the sense in which forced 
disappearance is a catastrophe, since it affects two essential assets, identity and language. 
Following this, I will present certain efforts to understand and exorcise this catastrophe,1 
which have proved fruitless since they demonstrate that in the face of extreme violence it is 
necessary, above all, not to abandon representation but instead to review our strategies for 
                                                 
*
 Article published in RCCS 88 (March 2010). 
1
 Other efforts are analysed in the book which contains the results of the research on which this article is based 
(Gatti, 2008), referring to various projects undertaken between 2005 and 2008 in Argentina and Uruguay, 
financed by the University of the Basque Country mobility scheme and the Basque government. This text 
analyses the results for the two countries, in particular Argentina.  
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representation. The text ends with a brief proposal concerning the means by which this may 
be achieved.  
 
1. Catastrophe: (Brief) theoretical notes 
There are facts that are associated in a stable manner with meanings and also facts that are 
completely dissociated from meaning. This dissociation may occur on an occasional or a 
lasting basis. In the latter case, we are confronted with problems involving the 
representation and accommodation of situations affected by this dissociation: if the 
dissociation between facts and meanings stabilises, we are faced with a social catastrophe. I 
will explain the concept in terms of a sequence: if degree zero is normality (facts united with 
meanings), it is followed by three distinct degrees of dissociation of facts and meanings 
resulting from trauma, a significant event and, on the boundaries of what is conceivable, 
catastrophe:  
1. The destabilisation that occurs with trauma is profound but provisional, since there are 
institutional practices that can regulate maladjustments and are able to ensure that 
after destabilisation a new balance is established. After a certain period of time, things 
return to their original place and normality is restored. The death of a loved one is a 
trauma; mourning, when it comes to an end and is resolved, is the practice that 
enables us to manage its effects.  
2. The destabilisation that follows a significant event is profound and intense, to the 
extent that when it happens the disruption is absolute but short in duration. As it is so 
intense, there is no category capable of describing it. Thus the event is unique and 
nameless, but rapidly fades. Few examples can therefore be cited: sudden bursts of 
pain, powerful revolts or intense pleasure, none of which leave any traces behind.  
3. Catastrophe is stable instability, a permanent maladjustment between words and 
things converted into a maladjusted structure. Catastrophe is a dynamic that creates 
a dismantling without founding an equivalent logic as part of its articulatory function  
(Lewkowicz, 2004: 154). The cause of the catastrophe does not disappear: it is the 
permanent exception, the abnormality of the norm, a permanent state of mourning. It 
is a trauma that is not resolved, an event that endures, ambivalence normalised. This 
time, the flood is here to stay  ibid.). Forced disappearance is an example of a social 
catastrophe, although there are also other, less serious examples such as the identity 
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of the undocumented  or certain situations involving precarious employment. 
Following a social catastrophe, a very problematic social space is constructed, which is 
defined by the breakdown of conventional relationships between social reality and 
language when this breakdown is consolidated, and in particular when consolidation 
creates permanent difficulties in terms of representing what takes place in the 
territories defined by the breakdown.2  
 
2. Forced disappearance. A catastrophe in context 
In an attempt to demonstrate the analytical usefulness of this concept in terms of 
understanding social situations defined by extreme violence, it will be applied to a concrete 
case, the forced disappearance of individuals and the figure of the detained-disappeared, 
within a particular social and historical context: the process of civilization as manifested (in 
exacerbated form) in Argentina and Uruguay. Within this context, the device of 
disappearance (Calveiro, 2004) and the figure it produces, the disappeared person, manifest 
themselves, in my view, as a device that aims at and a figure that embodies the 
destructuring and rupture of the most prototypical product of modern subjectivity, the 
individual-as-citizen.  
 
2.1. Gardeners, the construction of societies and individuals within the civilizing process in the 
Latin American Southern Cone  
As is the case with almost all of Latin America, Argentina and Uruguay are the result of the 
dream of civilization. There, the motives [of the coloniser] […] in founding new cities in the 
territory they had just conquered and destroying the old indigenous cities they had 
encountered en route corresponded to a new plan, that of inventing a new Europe  
(Blengino, 2005: 19). These were places imagined as having emerged out of nothing, like the 
                                                 
2
 This concept is formulated on the basis of notions of linguistic and psychological catastrophe. The former may 
be understood, following George Steiner and Alvin Rosenfeld, on the basis of the effects that extreme 
phenomena create on language. This is the case with Auschwitz, which, for Steiner, subjects language to such a 
p ofou d isis that he asse ts it is e o d la guage  . Fo  ‘ose feld, it o stitutes a e ita le 
li gui ide,  a ase of the death of la guage  apud Grierson, 1999). The latter may be approached through 
the o k of ‘e é Kaes, fo  ho  a ps hologi al atast ophe o u s he  the usual ethods of deali g ith 
the negativity inherent to a traumatic experience prove inadequate, especially when they cannot be used by 
the subject due to the particular qualities of the relationship between the inner traumatic reality and the 
su ou di g e i o e t  : . I  othe  o ds, it happe s he  a situatio  a ot e u de stood 
through the mechanisms for understanding structures which this situation has destroyed. 
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work of shaping a desert populated on the basis of a plan, a void filled thanks to careful 
gardening (Bauman, 1987), so that within it (1) a population can take shape (Foucault, 2006), 
(2) the Lettered City can be constructed (Rama, 1998), and (3) the subject that makes up the 
resident population of this city, the individual-as-citizen, can be configured.  
 
Shaping the population  
Since the 18th century, government has been exerted over populations, not territories. This 
is biopolitics, the means  – states Michel Foucault – by which […] the practice of 
government has attempted to rationalise the phenomena represented by a group of living 
beings formed into a population: problems relating to health, hygiene, birth rate, longevity 
and races  : . This government of populations has its own genealogy and its own 
protagonists.  
The genealogy of the government of populations can be located with no great difficulty 
when combined with the idea of creating a society. I will not dwell on this issue; it is 
sufficient to state that society is a recently invented form of social life (Donzelot, 1984; 
Kaufmann and Guilhaumou, 2003) that features in the collective imaginary of its many 
preceptors – from republicanism to anarchism and from liberalism to socialism – as a 
territory for corrective action (an arena for politics and rights) and observed action (an arena 
for sociologies and anthropologies). The pen of these preceptors was so mighty that as part 
of their social project they were able to create what they had dreamed of: a society, a 
strategic notion  Do zelot, : , which served to create, mould, model and modulate 
things and people.  
Things and people, that is, that conformed to the logic of the nation state and the 
individual-as-citizen, the protagonists in the narrative. I do not intend to enlarge on this 
either (Gatti, 2007): it is enough to recall that the metaphors that shape our subjectivities 
are a direct legacy, on a collective level, from the nation state and, on an individual level, the 
individual-as-citizen. Both are closely related and as such are similar, even though they give 
an impression of rivalry and conflict. Whether they like it or not, they have always shared the 
same parentage (modernity) and the same logic: both are organised, coherent, stable figures 
– like the state – and indivisible – like the individual. They are always uncontaminated and 
have their own place; they are never dirty or disorganised. Both constitute the model for 
modern life, to the extent that they have become our producers of solidity (Lewkowicz et al., 
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2003: 171). They constitute our song,  the melody that seduces us, the only way we have of 
viewing social life. I am not referring only to empirical references or administrative realities 
ut to ou  pa -institutional providers of meaning,  ou  ge e al p i iples of o siste  
(ibid.: 31 and 65), which, for the moderns, is equivalent to nothing less than basic geometry 
(Moya, 1984).  
 
The construction of the Lettered City  
However, things are not always the same everywhere: modern governamentality which, 
since the 18th century, has taken populations to be its object and product, and the nation 
state and the individual-as-citizen its favoured creatures, undoubtedly extends everywhere 
but in different ways. Thus, the task of colonising reality has its own historicity and 
territoriality: although they may appear to do so, the history of the invention of society in 
Europe and the history that accounts for this process in Latin America do not completely 
coincide. In the case of the former, battles were fought against the feudal state and the 
gamekeeper (Bauman, 1987), the stylised exponent of the pre-modern gardening culture  
and the subject with the power to administer his own domains, explains Bauman, frugally 
and freely. In the face of this policy, the rule of the knowledgeable and knowledge as a 
ruling force  ibid.: 67) was established in old Europe. However, it was not the same in 
America: the state did not concern itself with replacing the old gamekeepers but envisaged 
its task as that of installing gardeners, firstly to make civilizations grow and afterwards to 
maintain and take care of them.  
In Latin America, unlike the European norm according to which the city emerges after a 
lengthy process of development or, in some cases, by imposing itself in the face of the 
resistance of the feudal structure, the starting point is the ideal. Thus civilization is not a 
result, but a beginning.  
In essence, gardening is as hard a task as any other form of sociological engineering and is 
equally powerful and, without doubt, well intentioned and even beautiful. In addition, it 
involves orderliness: the gardener, as we know, is in charge of planning the garden and also 
of clearing the weeds and keeping what lies within the walls immaculately tidy, with 
admirable patience and persistence:  
Modern culture is a garden culture. It defines itself as the design for an ideal life and a perfect 
arrangement of human conditions. It constructs its own identity out of distrust of nature. […] 
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Apart from the overall plan, the artificial order of the garden needs tools and raw materials. It 
also needs defence – against the unrelenting danger of what is, obviously, a disorder. The 
order, first conceived of as a design, determines what is a tool, what is raw material, what is 
useless, what is irrelevant, what is harmful, what is a weed or a pest. (Bauman, 1989: 92)  
Ángel Rama has explored the idea that the Latin American city was born out of the 
execution of an erudite and scholarly plan. In this city, things fulfilled words, in an age in 
which words and things had begun to connect or, at least, to connect in accordance with 
modern pacts. Latin America, an empty continent in the collective imaginary of the 
colonizer, was a promising place for a good start to a life in the company of this newly 
created couple: Latin American cities basically became creations of the human mind, since 
they were inscribed in a cycle of universal culture in which the city became the dream of an 
order that could only take shape in the land of the New Continent  (Rama, 1998: 17). Virgin 
land, tabula rasa, ex nihilo creation, a perfect world dominated by representation. New 
Spain, New Helvetia, New León, New Pa is… The same as before, but without errors.  
This is the modern order of representation, that is, a prototype transposed onto reality. A 
pla i g principle,  in ‘a a s words, governed this translation of the model to the terrain. 
Even today, because they were efficient, the results of this work of representation (since it is 
representation that combats the void to be colonized) are striking: cities were born, states 
created, imaginaries devised, filled with utopias, defined by the plan by which they were 
designed and by the clauses with which it was embellished, including the obligation to keep 
the land free of plagues. This is relevant to the topic addressed here, namely the catastrophe 
of forced disappearances: it influenced a future that would continue to think in terms of 
civilizing, preserving and cleansing. At the end of the day, this future, our present, is not so 
far removed from these origins.  
Under modernity in the paroxysmal state, society submitted to the gaze of the 
engineer/gardener is seen as “an object of administration, as a collection of so many 
problems  to be solved, as nature to be o t olled , mastered , improved  or e ade , as 
a legitimate target for so ial engineering , and in general a garden to be designed and kept 
in the planned shape by force  Bau a , : ). Who sustained this dream? Rama refers 
to auditors, notaries, geographers, lawyers, clerks, bureaucrats… but the list can be 
extended to include scientists and priests (Blengino, 2005), and, at its limits, to various 
shades of the military.  
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The making of the civilized individual 
The subject who lives in this beautiful modern garden is the individual. Its management 
partly depends on his good relationship with the machinery for registration and socialisation 
that has existed in nation states since the 18th century (the census, schools, identity 
documents, personal records...). It also depends on the response he can give to the list of 
questions attached to the civilizing process, and to its demands for good manners and self-
consciousness (Elias, 2000). This subject has a history, however much it has become ahistoric 
nowadays and considered a sociological universal that accompanies the human condition  
(Béjar, 1988: 15). This is not the case; it is, on the contrary, something that has been recently 
invented:  
The group identity of the single person, his we-, you- or they-identity, played a much too 
important role, compared to the I-identity in the social praxis of the ancient world to give rise 
to a need for any universal concept for the single person as a quasi-groupless identity. (Elias, 
2001: 158)  
Elias offers clues for an approach to the social origins of this single subject that was, and 
is, the individual-as-citizen. In The Civilizing Process he analyses how the work of civilization 
takes place in conjunction with another task whose scope is only superficially more modest, 
the birth of the modern individual. Its origins may be traced by following a path in which, as 
external constraints increase, the level of self-consciousness rises. José María González 
García summarises the process well:  
This transformation presupposes a process of self-formation on the part of the individual, the 
transformation of his emotional system, the containing of emotions, a change in the precepts 
of good a e s  at the ta le o  at a  othe  gathe i g of good so iet , the development of 
a g eat apa it  fo  ps hologi al o se atio  of the self a d othe s […]. It creates a calculating 
type of man, always on the defensive, repressing his spontaneous emotional reactions, a great 
observer and understander of his own self and an expert in the psychological observation of 
the human being. (2001: 47-48)  
Civilization translates into psychologisation on the level of the affective economies, or 
rationalisation, which amounts to the same thing. Society ultimately finds its ideal partner 
on the level of personal subjectivities. Weber and Freud are united through the civilizing 
process. Society finds its balance – arrangements dictated by need coincide with directives 
for action:  
[C]onstraints through others from a variety of angles were converted into self- o st ai ts, […] 
the more animalistic human activities were p og essi el  th ust ehi d the s e es of people s 
communal social life and invested with feelings of shame, […] the regulation of the whole 
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instinctual and affective life by steady self-control became more and more stable, more even 
and more all-embracing. (Elias, 2000: 365)  
Thus society reveals itself as a grouping of self-controlled individuals: chaste, decorous, 
with good table manners, endowed with a psyche – a civilized psyche – and a growing level 
of internal differentiation, individuals who do not defecate or salivate in public, who eat 
nicely, all in the same way. They are the ideal inhabitants of the Lettered City. They are not 
machines; they often take part in public life and believe in citizenship and even in the 
possibility of change and improvement. Argentina and Uruguay are full of people like this.  
This is the purity of the American way  of implementing the civilizing process. Places 
emerged from the language of civilization, which, consumed with a kind of feverish 
nominalism, rechristened everything it found: Names for minerals, plants and people were 
changed and invented. Shrubs and grasses were scientifically classified. The clergy also 
changed people s names and used numbers to show the success of their evangelical 
enterprise  (Blengino, 2005: 56).  
The Lettered City, as Ángel Rama so aptly calls it: life as the result of writing (and the 
census and the judicial machinery and the national identity document). Foucault and Elias 
have outlined Argentina and Uruguay. Others have peopled them with individuals. These 
individuals have been devastated by the mechanism of disappearance.  
 
2.2. The mechanism of disappearance. Elias in the concentration camp 
The background to forced disappearance is a society based on a rhetoric in which the 
discourse of ex nihilo creation and that of elimination of surplus are played out and in which 
both the construction of what fits into the project and the disappearance of the 
dysfunctional and conflictual are of equal importance.  
This is ot si pl  a atte  of the a al st s i te p etatio ; those espo si le fo  the  
oup d état i  A ge ti a also po pousl  h iste ed the sel es the leade s of the P o ess 
of National Reorga isatio  a d o ilised the old imaginaries of the nation states in the 
region as states formed from the dialectic of order and disorder, civilization and barbarism 
(Blengino, 2005). They were the continuation of the work that began with the Wilderness 
Campaign, when the indigenous population of what is nowadays Argentina was annihilated.  
But how could this happen in countries considered by everyone – and especially by a 
significant number of those born in them, including the present author – to be educated, 
RCCS Annual Review, 3, October 2011                                                                                                                                       The Detained-Disappeared 
23 
enthusiastically shaped by literary references, with two capital cities that are more European 
than many actual European capitals since they are a synthesis of them? It is certainly 
tempting to argue that torture and, on a higher scale of brutality, forced disappearance, 
contradict the rules governing the progress of civilizing processes, that they are a throwback, 
an expression of what remains to be domesti ated, that still o e i ilizi g effo ts  are 
required (Bauman, 1989: 13). Yet, contrary to the hypothesis of a breakdown in civilization 
or the sudden emergence of barbarism, the hypothesis that what we are witnessing is a 
paroxysm of rationality is perhaps more accurate. In other words, the dictatorships of the 
1970s, rather than violating Argentine and Uruguayan societies or representing exceptions in 
their history, actually revealed that they contained a not insignificant number of bodies 
readily prepared to serve the extermination machine  Vezzetti, : .  
This, then, is the hypothesis: the forced disappearance of individuals is not barbarism but 
rather an exacerbated form of modernity. This is, in fact, the proposition on the basis of 
which Zygmunt Bauman (1989) analyses the Holocaust, when he argues that the logic of this 
phenomenon is not alien to our enlightened modernity, both in its most spectacular 
manifestations (scientific rationality and the construction of the idea of citizenship) and its 
ost a al the ga de e s pai staki g task of lea i g g ou d, the dedi ated do to s 
relationship with a patient… . The Holocaust was an enormous sociological laboratory  
(ibid.: 12) which sent out many signs, not of the dangers of a return to pre-social barbarism, 
but of the hidden possibilities of modern society  id.). This devastation is the apotheosis of 
the civilizing dream: The Holocaust was fully in keeping with everything we know about our 
civilization, its guiding spirit, its priorities, its immanent vision of the world – and of the 
proper ways to pursue human happiness together with a perfect society  (ibid.: 8).  
The Wilderness Campaign in Argentina, forced disappearance, Aus h itz… all these 
phenomena are legitimate resident[s] in the house of modernity; indeed, [they] would not 
be at home in any other house  ibid.: 17) and there can be no doubt that they all bear a 
strong family likeness to modernity.  
This hypothesis helps to make sense of what took place in the 1970s in Argentina and 
Uruguay as a radicalisation of the modern project. Thus, Hugo Vezzetti is right when he 
affirms that the [Argentine] dictatorship was as much an outcome as an eruption  : 
16).  
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2.3. The paradox of the detained-disappeared, a local invention 
Within this context of the civilizing process, the population policies and the (re)construction 
of the strictly planned Lettered City, from the 16th century to the 1970s, to the present day, 
the machinery has worked with automatisms: we are confronted with a state developing a 
population policy, operating as a gardener. Its keepers strive to ensure that Eden continues, 
and that if anything veers off course it will be contained and reorganised. The objective still 
remains to shape the wilderness through civilisation, taking care to ensure that what has 
been planted grows well. Yet not everything is a matter of history repeating itself. There are 
two major new features: the secret detention centre, the epitome of biopolitical space, a 
place for extreme control over life (Calveiro, 2004; Gatti, 2008), and the disappeared, an 
abysmal catastrophe. I will focus here on the latter.  
In this case, power was exercised as it always has been, over entities that defied the 
order. It was no exception – or rather, it was, since it had one glaring peculiarity: the entities 
subjected to forced disappearance were the most refined products of the process of 
civilization, card-carrying citizens, who were rational, educated and clean (or sullied by their 
own choice). The perfect fruits of modernity were the ones that would be ripped apart by 
the machinery that had brought them into being.  
This enormous force, the civilizing force, creates this landscape. And, if necessary, it 
unmakes it. It takes as the object of its work – and I would even say that this is historically 
unprecedented and thus theoretically fascinating and morally terrible – its own product, the 
modern, rational individual, whose identity is referenced with civic and administrative 
credentials. It takes the clean, self-conscious individual of the nation state, of liberal 
citizenship, the subject found on the psychoa al st s couch, and unmakes it. This is, I repeat, 
a true invention, so much so that it merits a name for the paradox from which it is created, 
the paradox of the detained-disappeared,  which may be formulated thus: (1) forced 
disappearance is one of the tools of population construction and management which belong 
to the civilizing/modern order; (2) forced disappearance is applied to the most complete 
products of the civilizing/modern order. Hence, the civilizing routine was applied to the most 
finished product of civilization. It is an inverted civilizing machine, a machine for de-
civilization, which is not the same as barbarism.  
Paying attention to the situation at the time – the military forces trained in the School of 
the Americas, the doctrine of national security and the generalised production of the 
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internal enemy, the Nazi, Spanish or Vietnam experiences – involves factors that would 
doubtless explain a great deal concerning this episode. The truth must lie out there. Yet 
none of them can account for the sub-liminal horror that forced disappearance has caused – 
and causes: probably unintentionally, an instrument that destroys meaning has been 
invented. A catastrophe: The beasts were painting La Giaconda when in reality they were 
killing flies with a paintbrush […]. They did unbelievable things, they separated identities 
from bodies, that was what they did. 3  
 
3. Forced disappearance as a catastrophe of identity and language
4
 
The disappeared person is an emergency, a singularity, an unintended consequence, 
something unforeseen. He is a fragmented individual; a body separated from a name, a 
consciousness removed from its physical support, a name separated from its history, an 
identity deprived of its citizen cards. He is a body to which things happen,  says the 
daughter of one. Pure vulnerability.  
Confronted with this, the word senses the threat of its own exhaustion […]. The threat of 
exhaustion damages it […] in terms of its essential and original power, the power to name  
(Gómez Mango, 2004: 15). Therefore disappearance and its figures can only be defined by 
using a set of semantically diffuse terms: chupado,5 separated, dissociated; borrado,6 a 
subject impossible to record within the repertoire of structured existence; chupaderos,7 
places of detention into which the subject was absorbed, abducted almost, by the 
mechanism of disappearance. The disappeared, Gómez Mango also says, is someone 
abandoned, a living-dead,  a corpse robbed of death,  someone always present by their 
absence  : .8 And this absence is a state, not a situation9: The category of 
                                                 
3
 From an interview with a member of the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team. 
4
 The quotations which follow are taken from interviews held, as part of the abovementioned research (see 
footnote 1), with members of the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team and the Association of Former 
Detained-Disappeared. In some cases they were taken from the archives of the Buenos Aires Memoria Abierta 
Foundation.  
5
 Missing person [T.N.]. 
6
 Wiped out, eliminated [T.N.]. 
7 Secret military prisons [T.N.]. 
8
 Gómez Mango, based on Arendt, proposes to include the disappeared in the list of the forsaken of the world: 
the p e a ious, the la desti e, the u do u e ted, efugees, pa iahs: The otio  of the fo sake  […] see s 
to me to be the best one to describe and understand the psychological suffering experienced by these pariahs 
of ode it  : , a  i e  e pe ie e of feeli g o eself adi all  e pelled f o  hu a it  ibid.: 8).  
9
 The author illustrates this difference by using the expressions se es desapa e ido  (the verb se  indicates a 
state or an essential quality) and se está desapa e ido  esta  i di ates a situatio  o  o ditio  [T.N.].  
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disappearance implies a presence-absence that endures over time  Ko do  and Edelman, 
2005).  
We are confronting a new state of being, in a previously unknown place. We had thought 
that within the architecture of existence it would not be possible to find a place between life 
and death, and that if it did exist (purgatory, limbo, ghosts, spectres… , it would be of short 
duration. But disappearance invents a perpetually unstable space, a kind of permanent 
liminality. Besides, it is unresolvable: there is not even the certainty of the death of the 
disappeared subject to bring closure.  
It is clear that this is an enormous catastrophe, a permanent dissociation: an entity that 
had had the status of individual-as-citizen is expelled beyond the pale, where previously 
tramps and scum were sent and, like them, converted into an NN.10 They cease to be citizens 
and become the disappeared. Therefore, the verb desaparecer (disappear) is not conjugated 
with the verb estar [to indicate a temporary condition] but with the verb ser [to indicate a 
state]: When they tell me tu estás desaparecido , it s ot actually estás desaparecido  [you 
are someone who has disappeared], ut és um desaparecido  [ ou a e o e of the 
disappea ed].  Nothing less than a new state of being is created You are one of the 
disappeared, neither living nor dead,  A non-person, a thi g that does t k o  hethe  it 
exists or not . An unprecedented status, a new abyss.   
It is true that forced disappearance has occurred in other chapters of history, for 
example, during the 1941 Nacht und Nebel (Night and Fog) campaign (Amnesty 
International, 1983) – which would appear to be the direct historical antecedent for the 
device – and during the Spanish Civil War. It still happens today in camps such as 
Guantanamo, or in Argentina itself, in the indigenous zone of Tucumán, where the policy of 
forced disappearance was particularly virulent and the effects as terrible as those in urban 
areas. In any of these cases, the strategy, systematically applied, is, in addition to being 
perverse, also effective.  
But it is not the same thing.  
It is not a question of partiality, far less of comparing horrors. I repeat my hypothesis to 
argue the point: in the civilized capitals of the Southern Cone, forced disappearance radically 
                                                 
10
 NN is used to mark the tombs of unknown individuals or mass graves. It means nomen nescio a e 
u k o  although due to a t a slatio  athe  tha  a se a ti  e o , it is t a slated as Ne hu  No e  o  
No Na e.  I  A ge ti a i  the s u e ous skeleto s appea ed i  NN g a es i  pu li  e ete ies, 
identified as those of disappeared individuals.  
RCCS Annual Review, 3, October 2011                                                                                                                                       The Detained-Disappeared 
27 
affects and destroys the forms of representation of identity and of the subject, whereas in 
the other places cited it is plausible to resort to devices which, in terms of local traditions, 
explain the existence of bodies without identities or names without bodies.11  
What is being demolished here is the mainstay of our means of understanding identity. It 
is the individual who is destroyed: he loses his name, has no territory and is separated from 
his history. This is the catastrophe: things no longer have words to give them consistency. 
The words that exist are no use: we are confronted with a figure represented as being 
without a place The disappeared leave no trace, they create a void , corresponding to no 
recognisable entity, simultaneously absent and present [With them] absence becomes 
presence , without logic Disappearance is an attack on logic. It creates a sense of the 
absurd , and without a body It is a body without an identity and an identity without a 
body . It is a nebulous territory between life and death, a true swamp: words and things 
melt and their unity is destroyed. A catastrophe.  
Or two catastrophes: one which has ravaged the modern architecture of identity and one 
which has ruined the possibility of representation. I will approach the former via the efforts 
made to reorder the remaining fragments of disappeared identities in order to reunite 
bodies and identities, and the latter through the task of bearing witness to what took place 
in the camps. Many organisations have helped give shape to one or the other. I have chosen 
two of the most representative to illustrate this work: the Argentine Forensic Anthropology 
Team (Equipa Argentina de Antropologia Forense), which works on the status of the 
fragmented identity, and the Association of Former Detained-Disappeared (Associação de Ex 
detidos-desaparecidos), which is drawing up strategies to give a voice to the horror.  
Both efforts aim to bring order to catastrophe, to introduce (imaginary) order into the 
chaos (of the imaginary) which forced disappearance creates. A great deal is achieved: 
contemplating disappearance, being able to make a statement … but the efforts almost 
always end in despair at their impossibility or the recognition of the incommensurability of 
                                                 
11
 Such as in Tucumán, in North Argentina, where people speak of the inausentes, as the Argentine researcher 
Me k  Vega i fo ed e. Disappea a e is o eptualised the e  i oki g t aditio al figu es he as take  
by a Familiar “pi it,  he as take   the Dog , so e of hi h date a k to the ti e of the Co uest. It is 
feasible to explore the hypothesis that in these traditions figures exist that can help to deal with forced 
disappearance and its consequences, figures that dull the pain caused by forced disappearance, which cannot 
be contained when it occurs in places that do not have these shock absorbers. It is not a matter of this being an 
advantage, since it indicates that the horror is not exceptional but part of a continuing sequence of affronts: 
o , as i  the past, the a ed e  o e.  
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the catastrophe in relation to the resources that can be mobilised to contemplate it, which 
amounts to the same thing.  
 
3.1. The catastrophe of identity and its (impossible) exorcism 
Little remains of the disappeared: there is information on their condition before they 
acquired this status, and the (incomplete, insecure) testimonies of their passage through the 
secret detention centres. In material terms, very occasionally a body without an identity 
remains, otherwise, there is an identity without a body, the name of someone known to be 
disappeared without any trace of their body. It may be the case that some bureaucratic 
remains survive — the advantage of having been swallowed up by that civilizing machine, 
the state — such as packages of papers, duly stamped trails testifying to the momentary or 
final emergence of someone from the catacombs of the machinery of disappearance and of 
their entry into the more visible and better known areas of the state apparatus prolific in 
institutions and people: the staff of the mortuaries who bury and testify, the doctors and 
nurses in out-patients who attend to a young woman who has been shot and write the 
report for the public hospital records, the experts and police on night duty who routinely 
photograph bodies found in the street and add the reports to the files, the state archivists 
who preserve a typed copy of this body without a name, the duty magistrates who verify and 
attest to the fa t that the od  elo gs to o od  a d that the desti atio  of this o -
identity is the mass grave in the public cemetery. But the most common scenario is that not 
even these traces remain and it is only possible to access — a strange and perversely 
redundant term — information that indicates that others had previously requested 
information about those who are now the disappeared: records of habeas corpus requested 
by mothers, copies of statements of disappearance submitted by spouses denied the status 
of legal subject by the state for the purpose of inheritances, purchases, sales… blocked by 
the impossible status of their partners … Nothing else.  
Here, the things that comprise a modern identity appear in fragments. In this task of 
fragmentation, the dismembering of a subject, lies the theoretical key, according to many 
agents, to the forced disappearance of individuals:  
1. Firstly there is the shattering of what is seen as the ontological unity of the human 
being, that which unites a body, and one only, with a name and one name only. The EAAF 
(Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team) states: What clandestine repression did was to 
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transform one thing into two; the identity and the body are the same thing, they have to be 
the same thing but at a certain moment it is as if you arrive at a particular place, a stopping 
point where the two things that form one are dissociated.  Terrible is the work of this 
machinery which decomposes the unity, naturalised in the modern subject, between body 
and consciousness, the condition of our ontological balance. It works by cutting up, dividing 
and dissociating this complete individual. It does nothing less than rupture the coexistence, 
within an entity that is always the same in itself (the semper idem of identity), of a body, 
which is mutable but whole, and a consciousness, which is mutable but essentially one. 
What emerges from this disintegration is a new figure: the disappeared, a subject, but a 
shattered subject, and an identity, but a pseudo-identity. A new state of being, a body 
separated from a name, a consciousness removed from its physical support.  
 
 
Skeletons dissociated from their names at the EAAF head office in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Stills from the 
film Nietos. Identidad y memoria (Ávila, 2004). The following is an excerpt from a statement by a member 
of the EAAF, taken from the same film: What we have still been unable to do in all cases [looking at the 
boxes] is to establish a meaningful relationship that would allow us to restore the basic relationship we all 
have between our identity and our body. Amongst other things, what state terrorism did in these cases 
was to dissociate, to separate identities from bodies. The identity remains in the air, and the body stays 
here. The aim of this work is for things not to remain the way they left them, and they left them like this 
[pointing to the boxes], with the identities separated from the bodies.   
 
2. The machinery has shattered this name and body, formerly united in an identity 
associated with a continuity, that of the family narrative, conveyed by parentage: What 
happened, the dismantling of the rights of individuals through disappearance, murder and 
the kidnapping of children, now young people and still disappeared, has led to a breakdown 
in the human system of parentage, it is a massacring of bonds and a fracturing of memory  
(Lo Giudice, n.d.).  
3. Finally, the machinery has shattered the relationship of the individual, as a body and a 
consciousness linked to a family history, with the administrative unit that gives him meaning 
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as a citizen, namely the state. He has been deprived of the rights of citizenship and described 
in terms similar to those used by gardeners when weeding land: rabble, ungovernable, classe 
dangereuse, vagabond, nomad, riffraff, mobile vulgus, outlaw, racaille, linyera,12 subversive… 
nameless people.  
These three interpretations of the fragmentation created by forced disappearance allow 
us to measure the depth of the catastrophe that this phenomenon brings to our 
understanding of identity. In the light of this, the reaction is to deal with the disaster by 
remaking what has been destroyed, in other words, by re-associating what has been broken 
up by disappearance, the pact between words-as-names and things-as-bodies. This is what 
the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team does, working with what remains of this pact, to 
reconstruct and restore meaning. It works within the limits of what is possible. It re-makes 
the work of the machine by inverting it and whereas, as I argue, the latter has de-civilized, it 
strives to re-civilize. It seeks to rebalance the relations between body and name (to recover 
identity), reconstitute the individual by reinstating him within his family history (creating 
mourning) and restore his status as a citizen (officially registering him as dead). It involves a 
lot of work, using the logic of the bureaucratic machinery, which gives and takes away 
identity, by inverting it: 
– From birth, an individual is given a number and an identity, no one escapes this. [Without 
this] you are not part of the state, you are not an individual in full possession of your rights. 
What happens is that this method of population registration is used [in cases of 
disappearance] in a different way. 
– [GG] And you are basically doing the same thing … 
– Yes, but in reverse.  
With one aim, to reconstitute the shattered identity: 
–  [GG] Identifying means restoring identity? 
– Of course. If I break this cup and have to stick it back together again, what do I do with the 
pieces? What was it before? A cup, so I have to end up with a cup again, if I e got all the 
fragments… I never have them all but it has to be as close to a cup as possible.  
                                                 
12
 A word used in Argentina to describe a tramp. 
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3.2. The catastrophe of language and (impossible) testimony 
You are what we once were, we are what you will be. 
(Inscription at the entrance to the old cemetery of 
Orereta, Guipúzcoa) 
 
Giorgio Agamben proposes that the Nazi concentration camp should be considered a space 
constructed on the basis of the logic of exception, the principle by which the law orders its 
own transgression (1998: 20). When exception occurs, it gives rise to two situations. Firstly, 
there is strict demarcation (exception takes place in a separate world), and afterwards, a 
specific language for this world that is inadequate in the world it contradicts, the world in 
relation to which it is an exception. This language has an awkward grammar and stammers: 
exception requires babble. These two facts coincide in the few reports that have emerged 
from the secret detention centres, the chupaderos in the jargon of the repressive machinery 
itself, places where all connections with the exterior are severed and the detained-
disappeared enters a space where daily life takes place in the deepest confines of cruelty 
and insanity  CONADEP, : . It is a place with rules that break the Rule: there, one ex-
disappeared told me, the laws of gravity were abolished,  and another said, the rules from 
outside did not apply. They overstepped all the limits.  A third individual explained: What is 
it that a t be conveyed? The deaths? The disappearances? The torture? All of this can be 
understood. I mean, understood mentally. What a t e understood? The anomy, ou a t 
understand the lack of rules.   
In her account of the time she spent in the Escola de Mecânica da Armada (Navy 
Mechanics School, known as ESMA), the most infamous of all the chupaderos, Pilar Calveiro 
des i es it thus: There is a very clear feeling that you are in a different dimension, in a 
world apart.  Cut off from the outside world, the concentration camp is, she says, a eal 
u ealit  go e ed  othe  ki ds of logi  Cal ei o, . Graciela Daleo, another survivor 
of the ESMA, testifies to the walks  outside the chupadero into which she had disappeared: 
I told self I as he e ut i  ealit  I as t i  this orld.  There is a world switched on, 
with clear rules, and a world switched off, which is invisible, dark, disappeared, and 
exceptional.  
Out of this exceptional space, this fringe of reality in which norms are suspended and 
order is defined by this suspension (Agamben, 2008), emerge the agents of testimony – the 
former detained-disappeared. They are the ex-disappeared who occupy a complicated place 
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that is difficult to deal with in a world that copes badly with the non-standard and, suffering 
as it does from horror vacui, abhors a lack of meaning. They exist in a disturbing space 
between two worlds, a paradoxical limbo, an ambivalent purgatory We still do t elo g 
anywhere ; Sometimes I felt like a ghost, nobody listened to us, nobody believed us , 
places as aberrant as they are abnormal and always impossible. The ex-disappeared inhabits 
a difficult place. How can they continue to cling to an identity, the identity of the 
disappeared – the inhabitants of a black hole – if, when they emerge from the hole, that 
identity no longer exists? How can they protest and continue to speak as the disappeared if, 
precisely because they can now speak, they are no longer these people?  
The first step towards exorcising this catastrophe is to find a common name to describe 
this difficult collective situation: the appeared,  the reappeared disappeared,  ghosts,  
the disappeared who appea .  The second step is to give substance to this common name 
by constructing a communal arena for speech, a communitas, in this case the Association of 
Former Detained-Disappeared, a community support base in Argentina for many ex-
prisoners which makes their group identity plausible: A place of our own,  A bit like our 
own union, the su i o s  u io .  A shared but complex place, a springboard for the staging 
of a shared stigma, an open sore We are an open wound, we are the ones who bear the 
marks of the camps on our bodies,  We are the ones who escaped death,  We are the 
o es ho ha e o e a k f o  the oid ). And once the common name and shared place 
have been established, the third step is to speak through them.  
This speech takes the form of testimony. For many it is almost a mission: that of the 
terstis who mediates and conveys information, a kind of medium (Agamben, 2008: 17).13 
But what does the witness bear witness to? And how? Agamben, basing his ideas on the 
work of Primo Levi, analyses the relationships established between two types of individuals 
from the camps: those who succumbed and those who saved themselves. The latter, the 
survivors, can talk about the camp, but only in relative terms: those who have lived through 
                                                 
13
 According to Agamben (2008: 17) the witness is the terstis, the i te edia  the pe so  ho, i  a t ial o  
lawsuit between two rival pa ties is i  the positio  of thi d pa t . The superstes is the person who has lived 
through something and survived and can therefore bear witness to it; and the auctor is the person who makes 
the testimony emerge, a narrator or, in other words, the person who narrates a fact which they have survived 
with the intention of providing information, even if this fact is something that cannot be survived, is not 
reportable and cannot be recounted (cf. 148 ff.). 
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it cannot – they have looked on the Gorgon.14 The former bear witness and represent; the 
latter, who are mute, are represented. The former are locked into the absurdity of the 
impossible: they speak of something they have approached, but not touched. This is what 
Agamben calls Le i s paradox : The Muselmann is the complete witness  : 82, 150, 
165 ; I bear witness for the Muselmann  ibid.: 165). Adapted to our context, this would be: 
(1) the disappeared is the complete witness; (2) the ex-disappeared speak in place of the 
disappeared.  
Thus, those who can bear witness have no words and those who have words have 
nothing to say. Despairingly, as some of them recognise, The onus is on the disappeared 
and they cannot bear witness, they cannot speak. And those of us who have in some way 
been in the same places as the disappeared, what we are doing, seems to me to be … false,  
they are the witnesses . Prisoners of paradox, they realise that those who can truly bear 
witness do not have the word and those who have the word have nothing to say: Testimony 
appears here as a process that involves at least two subjects: the first, the survivor, who can 
speak but has nothing interesting to say; and the second, who has seen the Go go , who 
has touched bottom , […] has much to say but cannot speak  (Levi, 2008: 120).  
 
4. Conclusion: Representing catastrophe  
What can those who have not experienced the extremes of horror, even though they have 
come close to it, speak about? How can they account for this catastrophe of language? 
Some of the ex-disappeared opt to turn the situation on its head, speaking of the void that 
opens up between the disappeared (the fact in all its intensity) and themselves, the 
witnesses (who can represent the fact). It is within this void that the testimony is situated, 
and this is the tension it expresses: the terrible tension to which forced disappearance 
submits language. Someone accurately said that that the testimony of extreme situations is 
the discourse that gives linguistic expression to the unnameable  “u asas, : , ot 
through the representation of the truth it contains but because it is the best response to the 
impossibility of achieving this in these situations, of the despair at being unable to tell, of not 
                                                 
14
 The Gorgon is the Greek goddess who had the power to kill those ho looked at he . Le i sa s: We, the 
su i o s, a e ot the t ue it esses […]. We su i o s a e […] a  a o alous i o it : e a e those ho,  
their prevarications or abilities or good luck did not touch the bottom. Those who did so, those who saw the 
Gorgon, have ot etu ed to tell a out it o  have etu ed ute, ut they a e the Musli s , the su e ged, 
the complete witnesses […]. The  a e the ule, e a e the e eptio  (1989: 83-84; my italics). 
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having words. It gives words – truncated words – to a place from which words have been 
banished. Thus, the survivors bear witness to a missing testimony. […] they must bear 
witness in the name of the impossibility of bearing witness  Aga e , : 34).  
It is therefore not surprising that one of the ex-disappeared, feeling impotent, should ask 
at the beginning of his testimony, How can I structure this delirium?  and another admit If 
I had to recount what I believe was the experience of the condition of the disappeared … I 
would have to stay silent, I would have to stop talking.  Nor is it strange that they think that 
what happened is utterly unrepresentable:  
The experience you have lived through can be told, but I think there is a small part that […]. 
There is something that lies beyond this, that has another register.  
The balance of my experience has to do precisely with the difficulty in conveying it, there is 
something that is impossible to t a s it…  
The narratives that Vezzetti (2000) calls the chupadero narratives, that is, the reports 
emerging from the secret detention centres, have an unusual structure. When the ex-
disappeared return from the camp, they believe they have been reborn: they are once again 
instated, reincorporated into the things we call o al,  whether this means the idiotic 
bureaucracy of an ordinary prison or a penitentiary that clearly has the status of an 
exception. Reality is restored and words reappear,  one survivor explains. But the words 
that reappear cannot bear witness to the experience, since they refer to something else. 
They have emerged from a buried world into the light of another. Each has its own logic, but 
they are untranslatable. What functions in one does not function in the other. The 
experience finds no place in the recognised language.  
There are no references for the impossible. However much is translated in the objective 
and objectifying nature of a testimony intended to be faithful to what took place, or 
attempts are made to steer the negative that cannot be inscribed into a framework of 
socially shared rationalisation within which an abnormal fact may be inscribed (for example, 
the language of political explanation or the more slippery framework, also supplied with 
convenient causalities, of attributing moral perversion to the oppressor), however much this 
is achieved, a latent despair always remains in those who speak. Firstly it is the despair that 
what is being recou ted is ei g told adl  The e is so ethi g that is ot o p ehe si le 
i  this e pe ie e ; The e is so ethi g he e of a  e pe ie e, I o t sa  … I do t a t to 
all it i effa le, ut it is , and it is also despair at recounting only the surface ( [Whe  ou 
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tell it] you leave out everything you felt when you experienced it, as if you were 
t a sfo i g it i to a ate ial thi g . This is the testimony of the ex-disappeared: the 
despair at not being able to represent. They skimmed the surface of the catastrophe and 
that, some say, cannot be explained. How can this enormity be explained!  And in the 
camps, words disappear too.   
Clandestine repression constructed a place for the exercise of power, probably applied 
through the banal actions of bureaucrats who exerted repression as a matter of routine. The 
secret detention centre helped this power to grow into something disturbing, beyond the 
control of the bureaucrat. It was a place of exception, where language did not work, which 
could scarcely be spoken about, about which it was only possible to stammer and stutter. 
The testimony is the formula for doing so. It gives words to the catastrophe that is forced 
disappearance: it marks the lapses, the holes, the cracks in the representation. Its 
spokespeople are the agents who live in this anfractuosity shaped from the rupture between 
words and things, and who, in order to talk about it, develop a language that speaks of the 
impossibility of speaking.  
 
If catastrophic situations exist, we, the prisoners of horror vacui, want to master them 
and saturate them with meaning. When faced with forced disappearance this is what 
forensic anthropologists and the ex-disappeared do: the former want to restore the 
conventions on which our idea of identity is based (BODY + NAME) and the latter want to 
restore the conventions on which representation is based (THINGS/WORDS). Nevertheless, both 
end up only partly achieving their aim: they come close to achieving responses in terms of 
what happened, which is fundamental in many areas (justice, truth), but remain distant from 
responses to what a catastrophe is. It is the detained-disappeared; it therefore requires a 
reconsideration of how identity is created and language is constructed when the modern 
meanings of both terms are confronted with issues that call them into question.  
Translated by Sheena Caldwell 
Revised by Teresa Tavares 
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